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Abstract. We introduce here the first volume of Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial 
Organization: Theory, by L. C. Corchón and M. A. Marini (eds.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenam, UK and 
Northampton, MA, by describing its main aim and its basic structure. 
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Game theory lies at the heart of modern industrial organization. Over the second half of the last 
century, it provided a sound foundation to the main equilibrium concepts adopted in classical industrial 
economics, as in Cournot, Bertrand and Stackelberg models. It also allowed to build up new and 
rigorous conceptual frameworks for many industrial organization topics, as product differentiation, 
predation, delegation, mergers, collusion and R&D in imperfectly competitive markets. Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, over the years game theory has constantly continued to inspire new research 
grounds in the field of industrial organization which, in some cases, went far beyond the scope of the 
discipline. This occurred, for instance, in the development of dynamic and incomplete information 
games or in the recent applications of game theory to law and economics, networks, digital economy, 
auctions, experiments, health economics, intellectual property rights, contests and corruption, just to 
cite a few. Furthermore, it should be stressed that the relationship between game theory and industrial 
organization has never been unidirectional.3 
 
Thus, it is not exaggerated to say that game theory has become the common language of industrial 
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organization.4 In particular the adoption of a sound mathematical language has allowed industrial 
organization to steadily progress towards new and unexplored fields. As an example, the recent use of 
experimental game theory for industrial economics has opened the door to behavioral models for the 
explanation of the bias of consumers and sellers in the market.5 
 
Due to the strong and increasing interlink between game theory and industrial organization, the current 
volume aims to provide a solid introduction to the main topics lying at the crossroads between these 
two disciplines. In managing such a - seemingly arduous - task, our major contribution as editors was 
mainly to attract a quite impressive array of renown economists in the challenge to yield up-to-date 
surveys for the volume. As a final result, and specially thanks to the outstanding quality of the 
contributors, the current Handbook appears suitable to both established researchers as well as to 
graduate and advanced undergraduate students. 
 
Given the wide heterogeneity of topics being at the boundary between game theory and industrial 
organization, our primary aim in assembling the book was to give a rational structure to the great 
amount of material gathered for its preparation. 
 
In our final plan for the Handbook, we judged as appropriate to divide the book into two volumes 
where, while the first volume is mainly devoted to present the major game-theoretic modelling tools 
currently in use in modern industrial organization, the second is specifically aimed to apply these tools 
to a wide range of industrial organization topics.  
 
More specifically, the first volume is organized into four parts corresponding to four distinct topics: (i) 
Basic games in industrial organization; (ii) Dynamic games in industrial organization; (iii) Games of 
collusion in industrial organization; (iv) Information games. 
 
More in detail, part I of this first volume of the Handbook aims at providing an overview of the basic 
game-theoretic tools currently used in modern industrial organization, as lattice techniques, aggregative 
games, monopolistic competition models, oligopoly models with product differentiation, welfare 
analysis and contest theory. 
 
Part II introduces the state of the art in the literature applying dynamic games to well-known dynamic 
industrial organization topics as Stackelberg, entry, evolutionary games. 
 
Part III aims at surveying the main cooperative and noncooperative games commonly adopted for the 
analysis of horizontal mergers and collusion. 
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Finally, part IV provides an overview of some important classes of models dealing with informational 
issues in imperfectly competitive markets, as trading under asymmetric information, principal-agent 
under moral hazard, learning in markets and information-sharing in oligopoly. 
 
In the next sections we describe in more detail the content of every single chapter composing the 
Handbook. 
Part I: Basic games in industrial organization 
In the chapter on strategic complementarities in oligopoly Xavier Vives provides a detailed overview 
of many recent results obtained by applying the techniques of supermodular games to the analysis of 
firm behaviour in imperfect competitive markets. Beside offering an excellent introduction to the recent 
lattice-theoretic methods, the chapter reviews the results obtained in the existence and comparative 
statics of Cournot, Bertrand, R&D, advertising, multidimensional and multimarket competition models. 
In addition, it introduces the use of supermodularity for the analysis of well-known classes of two-stage 
dynamic games as entry, dynamic strategic incentives and both Markov and incomplete information 
games applied to voluntary disclosures and auctions. 
 
In the chapter on the existence and comparative statics in Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly, Rabah 
Amir surveys two important strands of literature in oligopoly theory, one dealing with the existence of 
Cournot equilibrium in the general asymmetric and symmetric cases and the other with the effects of 
exogenous entry on market performance in a Cournot industry. This chapter emphasizes that these two 
strands of literature share one important unifying common feature: both are achieved via the 
application of lattice-theoretic methods. This also provides a bridge with the previous chapter. 
  
In aggregative games Martin Kaae Jensen nicely complements the first two chapters by introducing 
three important classes of widely used aggregative games: (i) linearly aggregative games; (ii) 
generalized aggregative games; (iii) quasi aggregative games. These games are very useful in industrial 
organization since they drastically simplify the analysis of existence, comparative statics and 
uniqueness of Nash equilibria and unify a vast amount of literature since they apply to a wide array of 
models like Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly, tournaments, work in teams, contests, patent races and 
network games. 
 
In the following chapter monopolistic competition with no apology, Jacques Thisse and Philip Ushchev 
review what has been accomplished under the heading of monopolistic competition in industrial 
organization and in other closely related economic fields. Among other things, the authors argue that 
monopolistic competition is a market structure in its own right which encompasses a much broader set-
up than the celebrated constant elasticity of substitution (CES) model. Also, although oligopolistic and 
monopolistic competition compete for adherents within the economics profession, the authors explain 
how such dichotomy is, to a large extent, unwarranted, being both models complements rather than 
substitutes. 
 
In oligopoly and product differentiation Jean Gabszewicz and Ornella Tarola overview old and new 
oligopoly models on product differentiation characterized by local competition. Starting by the 
microeconomic theory of consumer demand based on characteristics, as introduced by Gorman (1956 
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and 1980) and then popularized by Lancaster (1966), they present the horizontal product differentiation 
as based on Hotelling (1929) and vertical product differentiation as based on Gabszewicz and Thisse 
(1979). Finally, they review the model nesting both horizontal and vertical product differentiation and 
propose two applications of this approach, one based on network externalities and the other on 
environmental economics. 
 
In his chapter on oligopolistic competition and welfare, Robert Ritz nicely reviews the recent 
developments in the study of social welfare in oligopoly markets. In particular, the chapter covers the 
usefulness of the rate of cost pass-through for the analysis of market performance and includes a 
careful analysis of welfare losses due to market power in various widely-used models (with symmetric 
and asymmetric firms, and with or without endogenous entry). 
 
Part II: Dynamic games in industrial organization 
This second part of the book offers a collection of chapters focussing on the use of dynamic games in a 
set of well known industrial organization issues.  
 
The initial chapter by Klaus Ritzenberger on dynamic games sets the ground by introducing three 
alternative definitions of game trees and extensive forms and also discussing in detail their pros and 
cons. In the following sections, the author comes back to the normal form associated to the extensive 
form and explains the concept of perfect recall and its significance for economic applications. 
 
In Strategic Refinements, Carlos Pimienta examines the classical literature on equilibrium refinements. 
Starting with Nash's definition of equilibrium, the chapter presents a comprehensive review of the most 
successful equilibrium concepts adopted in economic applications as well as the most recent 
contributions to the subject. The chapter explains in detail how a few decision-theoretic criteria - 
admissibility, backwards induction, forward induction and invariance - shape the definition of stable 
sets of equilibria and how they translate into their corresponding mathematical formulation. 
In Stackelberg games Ludovic Julien introduces three classes of deterministic noncooperative 
Stackelberg games with increasing level of generality. The first is the basic duopoly game. The second 
is the oligopoly multiple leader-follower game. The third extends the multiple leader-follower setup 
within the framework of bilateral oligopoly to describe a multi-commodity market. In each case, the 
author defines and characterizes the equilibrium and the welfare consequences of market power. The 
chapter also considers the issues of endogenous timing, merging and free entry. 
 
In the chapter on entry games and free entry equilibria, Michele Polo reviews how a wide range of 
symmetric oligopoly models share some common comparative statics properties. Individual profits and 
quantities decrease in the number of firms, and tend to competitive or monopolistic competitive 
equilibria when the number of firms increases indefinitely. The maximum number of firms sustainable 
in a symmetric long-run equilibrium are shown to depend on technology (economies of scale), 
preferences (market size) and strategies (toughness of price competition). On the normative side, in 
homogeneous product markets the business stealing effect drives the result of excessive entry, whereas 
adding product differentiation and the utility from variety may revert this result. In addition the author 
considers asymmetric free entry equilibria using the aggregative nature of many oligopoly models as 
we noted before. Finally, he discusses the issue of endogenous sunk costs, persistent concentration and 
frictionless entry in contestable markets. 
	 5	
 
In their chapter Evolutionary oligopoly games with heterogeneous adaptive players, Gian Italo Bischi, 
Fabio Lamantia and Davide Radi analyze the properties of evolutionary switching models in oligopoly 
games, where boundedly rational agents can follow different behavioral rules (or heuristics) to update 
their production through repeated adaptive decisions. In particular, they focus on well known heuristics 
such as best replies with naive expectations, local monopolistic approximation and gradient dynamics 
on marginal profits. Hence, the chapter examines some specific examples of evolutionary systems 
where the coexistence of heterogeneous behaviors and of oscillatory time patterns are obtained as 
possible outcomes. 
 
Part III: Games of Collusion in Industrial Organization 
In this part of the volume we gather two theoretical contributions on collusion and mergers in 
oligopolies.  
 
In the first chapter coalitions and networks in oligopolies, Francis Bloch reviews the models on 
endogenous formation of coalitions and networks in oligopolies. It weaves together a literature in game 
theory on cooperation and a literature in industrial organization on the formation of groups of 
oligopolistic firms. The discussion of cooperation in oligopolies starts with a brief presentation of the 
game-theoretic models used to predict the formation of coalitions and networks. Two different forms of 
cooperation are considered: (i) cartels and horizontal mergers; (ii) strategic alliances, which encompass 
both research joint ventures and information exchange platforms. 
 
In the chapter on TU oligopoly games and industrial cooperation, Jingang Zhao surveys the existing 
results on TU cooperative games applied to oligopolies and lists nine promising future areas for TU 
oligopoly games. On the theoretical side, TU oligopoly games are shown to make advances on the 
refinements and applications of the core, one of the most important solution concepts in cooperative 
game theory. On the empirical side, the author shows how cooperative games can allow the analysis of 
industrial cooperation and, hence, the understanding of all forces at work behind industrial changes 
with and without regulatory policies. 
 
Part IV: Information and search 
The final part of the first Handbook volume looks at the various effects occurring in markets when 
relaxing the assumption of symmetric information. 
 
In their chapter trading under asymmetric information: positive and normative implications, Andrea 
Attar and Claude d'Aspremont mainly focus their attention on screening models. They divide the 
chapter in two parts. The first part adopts a simple mechanism design approach with only one 
mechanism designer. When the mechanism designer is an outsider (say a public authority), all traders 
may have private information and play simultaneously. When the mechanism designer is an insider (a 
principal, buyer or seller), he is uninformed and has no private information. Three illustrative 
applications are taken into account: bilateral trade, auctions and insurance. In the second part of the 
chapter these model are extended to the case of several principals who are uninformed and have no 
private information but compete by designing mechanisms. 
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In moral hazard: base models and two extensions, Inés Macho-Stadler and David Pérez-Castrillo 
analyze first the optimal contracts in static moral hazard situations, where the agent's effort is not 
verifiable. Then, they present the main trade-offs of the principal-agent model. Furthermore, they cover 
in detail the trade-off of incentives (motivation) vs. risk-sharing (efficiency), incentives vs. rents (when 
the agent is protected by limited liability), incentives to a task vs. incentives to another (in a multitask 
situation), and incentives to the agent vs. incentives to the principal (when both exert a non-verifiable 
effort). Finally, they discuss how the predictions of the classical moral hazard model are affected when: 
(i) there are behavioral biases of individuals and, (ii) in presence of a matching market. 
 
In their chapter on learning in markets, Amparo Urbano surveys the problem of market learning as well 
as that of experimentation (or active market learning) in dynamic models incorporating a Bayesian 
expectation revision mechanism. Through the lens of this perspective, she reviews the extensive 
literature on this topic. The experimentation literature has by and large focused on broadly defined 
bandit models, and thus the starting point is the monopolist experimentation with the classic two-armed 
bandit problem. The essay extends to surveying the impact of price competition on experimentation, 
the role of externalities in social learning and learning in experience good markets. 
 
In the chapter on information sharing in oligopoly, Sergio Currarini and Francesco Feri review the 
theoretical literature on information sharing in oligopoly and discuss some recent contributions 
extending the traditional multilateral model to encompass the possibility of bilateral sharing 
agreements. In the first part of the survey the authors revisit the early insights of the literature, stressing 
the role of quantity vs. price competition and of common vs. private values. In the second part, 
following some more recent contributions, they discuss the bilateral model of information sharing, 
stressing the role of signals' correlation for the emergence of information sharing in equilibrium and its 
effect on the architecture of sharing networks. Finally, they conclude the analysis by discussing the 
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